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A Modest Proposal for Expediting Manuscript 
Selection at Less Prestigious Law Reviews 
Joseph Scott Miller† 
As one student remarked, in a recent study of law review editors, “[a]uthors are 
brutal. They are so calculating it’s scary. They would sell you into slavery if Har-
vard asked them to … .”1 
Law review publishing is weird. Any system that runs on massive simultaneous 
submission is bound to be.2 
The conventional wisdom, in project management circles, is that one cannot obtain 
a good outcome quickly at low cost. When it comes to these three desiderata, you get 
only two at a time; “fast, cheap, and good” is not on oﬀer. Or so we are told. 
But what about selecting from among the many unsolicited manuscripts submitted 
to every student-run general law review? Can an editorial board cull—at high speed 
and low cost—a group of well-reasoned, well-written articles from the torrents that 
arrive each March and August through ExpressO and Scholastica digital-submission 
pipelines? Can it get results that are fast, cheap, and good? A board can do so, if it is 
willing to embrace, fully, the dynamics of professors’ requests for expedited review in 
the market for publishing prestige. This essay sketches the strategy.  
Start with ﬁve givens that set the frame …  
• Most general law reviews publish about four issues per year, and most issues of a 
general law review publish about ﬁve articles. Assuming a review is not publishing 
invited pieces, symposia, or the like, that translates to a target of 20 articles under 
contract. (If the review is publishing invited pieces, the target number is smaller still.) 
• Most general law reviews receive hundreds, if not thousands, of unsolicited man-
uscripts a year. The 20-article target a review must hit is thus but a small fraction of 
what it receives as a matter of course. Even a small yield will be suﬃcient. 
• The prestige of U.S. law schools, reﬂected in the U.S. News rankings, is strongly 
positively correlated with the prestige of their general law reviews, reﬂected in the 
frequency with which the articles in the reviews are subsequently cited.3 
                                                
† Professor, University of Georgia School of Law. © 2016 Joseph Scott Miller. 
1 Leah M. Christensen & Julie A. Oseid, Navigating the Law Review Article Selection Process: An Empirical 
Study of Those With All the Power—Student Editors, 59 S.C. L. REV. 207 (2007) (ellipsis in original). 
2 James Grimmelmann, Scholastica Sunt Servanda, The Laboratorium (2d ser.), Apr. 14, 2015, available at 
http://2d.laboratorium.net/post/116408726220/scholastica-sunt-servanda.  
3 See Alfred L. Brophy, The Relationship Between Law Review Citations and Law School Rankings, 39 CONN. 
L. REV. 43, 48-49 (2006). 
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• Law professors generally prefer to publish a given article in a more prestigious 
law review. Most will act on that preference when they can do so. 
• In a quest to place their articles in more prestigious publishing venues, many law 
professors frequently submit their manuscripts to multiple reviews for simultaneous 
consideration.4 And for at least about 30 years now, law professors typically shop any 
publication oﬀers they receive to editors at the more prestigious journals, where—as I 
have said—they would prefer to publish.5 Law review editors, for their part, have come 
to use the expedite requests—predicated on genuine oﬀers received from less prestig-
ious law reviews after substantive consideration—as one of their screening mechanisms 
in deciding what to focus on next for more thorough consideration.6 
In this context, how can editorial boards at less prestigious law reviews get the 
greatest editorial beneﬁt at lowest cost? It turns out to be rather simple, in fact. 
The strategy has three interwoven elements. It would not make sense to use the 
elements piecemeal; I have designed the proposal as a coherent, integrated whole. The 
key is to realize that, in this largely industrial (rather than personal or scholarly) pro-
cess, a journal should focus its scarce individualized-review attention on submissions 
from authors who are predictably more likely to accept an oﬀer of publication. Any 
approach that ignores the data about which authors are more likely to accept and which 
authors are more likely to reject—likelihoods pegged to authors’ institutional aﬃlia-
tions, which all the journals can readily see—wastes precious student time and atten-
tion for no good reason. 
First, the editorial board identiﬁes its current prestige-point among prospective 
authors, by determining the institutional aﬃliations of the law-professor authors who 
have published in the journal over the last seven to ten years. In determining prestige-
point, the review should count only the pieces that were unsolicited manuscripts, and 
thus were exposed to the push and pull of the March and August trading periods before 
                                                
4 See Nancy Levit, Scholarship Advice for New Law Professors in the Electronic Age, 16 WIDENER L.J. 947, 
975-76 (2007) (describing multi-journal submission). This would be cause for scandal in most academic 
ﬁelds, but in law it is the norm.  
5 See Erik M. Jensen, The Law Review Manuscript Glut: The Need for Guidelines, 39 J. LEGAL EDUC. 383, 
384-85 (1989) (describing the process); Jordan H. Leibman & James P. White, How the Student-Edited 
Law Journals Make Their Publication Decisions, 39 J. LEGAL EDUC. 307, 409 (1989) (same). As one profes-
sor recently put it, “[a]n oﬀer to publish does not bind the author, but rather invites the author to 
leverage the oﬀer by making an ‘expedite’ request with a higher-ranked law journal.” Albert H. Yoon, 
Editorial Bias in Legal Academia, 5 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 309, 311 (2013). 
6 See Nathan H. Saunders, Student-Edited Law Reviews: Reﬂections and Responses of an Inmate, 49 DUKE 
L.J. 1663, 1666 (2000) (“Finally, and most importantly, let the editors of other law journals do your work 
for you; that is, concentrate your eﬀort on expedited reviews—articles which have already received an 
oﬀer from another journal.”). In this way, higher-prestige editorial boards partner with higher-prestige 
professors, helping the professors accept the low-prestige journals’ tacit “invitations,” Yoon, id., to shop 
their articles up the chain. 
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landing, ﬁnally, in the review’s pages. For example, Gamma Law Review might ﬁnd 
that, from 2005 to 2015, only 1% of its authors were at a top-30 law school when they 
accepted the journal’s oﬀer of publication, and only 5% of its authors were at a top-50 
law school when they accepted.7 For GLR, it makes sense to target the submissions of 
law professors who are at schools below the top 50. (If the percentages change in the 
future, the prestige-point and related focus of GLR’s eﬀorts can change along with 
them.) For its part, Delta Law Review might ﬁnd that, in the same period, 1% of its 
authors were at top-10 schools, and 5% of its authors were at top-20 schools. For DLR, 
it makes sense to target the submissions of law professors who are at law schools below 
the top 20. Each school uses its own rolling decade of author•school data to set a pres-
tige-point that can help direct editorial resources. 
Second, the board sorts incoming manuscripts according to the institutional aﬃlia-
tions of the authors who submit them, using the review’s own prestige-point to draw 
the line that separates the manuscripts into two categories. The manuscripts in the 
resulting batches receive diﬀerent editorial treatment and correspondingly diﬀerent 
types of publication oﬀers. Along the way, editorial eﬀort is much more closely cali-
brated to the likely pay-oﬀ to the journal from having made an oﬀer. 
Professors at schools above the journal’s prestige-point receive ultra-expedited oﬀers, 
because those professors are extremely unlikely to accept the oﬀers (based on the prior 
decade’s data for that journal, updated annually). In this group, the review oﬀers to 
publish simply on the basis of the author’s institutional aﬃliation and gives the author 
two (certainly no more than three) days to accept the oﬀer.8 That a professor may shop 
the oﬀer to more prestigious journals is of no consequence, given that the oﬀer took 
virtually no eﬀort to provide and is almost certain to be rejected (whether providing it 
was costly or not). If a professor unexpectedly accepts the oﬀer, the paper is likely to 
be of a quality broadly similar to the rest of the journal’s content9—no cause for worry. 
Professors at schools at or below the journal’s prestige-point receive individualized 
editorial review, because these professors are more likely to accept any resulting oﬀers 
(based, again, on the rolling-decade data). In this group, resulting oﬀers could provide 
authors a week (or 10 days) to accept, thus allowing time for substantive exchanges 
                                                
7 It will take a bit of eﬀort to create the ﬁrst-generation spreadsheet containing these author/school/rank 
data, but it should take only minimal eﬀort to update it with each new journal issue. 
8 Extensions of time are out of the question, increasing manuscript-tracking costs for no beneﬁt. 
9 See generally Jeﬀrey L. Harrison & Amy R. Mashburn, Citations, Justiﬁcations, and the Troubled State of 
Legal Scholarship: An Empirical Study, 3 TEX. A&M L. REV. 45, 79-80  (“The empirical results show that 
many articles in a ten-year span are not cited by any court or author, and many that are cited serve no 
useful function in helping the citing author advance or articulate a new idea, theory, or insight. … Based 
on statistics found in this Article and other places, one might conclude that this oversupply is found in 
the scholarship published in lower ranked journals. The unfortunate truth is that, regardless of their 
quality, it is unlikely that articles in those publications would be missed. This observation is more com-
pelling when one recalls that this study considered only the top 100 reviews.”) (footnote omitted).  
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between an author and the editorial board. As with the automatic oﬀers, however, these 
individualized oﬀers should not be extended; the journal obtains no beneﬁt from as-
sisting the author in his or her eﬀorts to shop the piece to more prestigious reviews, 
and stands to gain articles at the margin (from risk-averse authors) by holding fast. 
Happily, the sorting process described above can be automated, or nearly so, such 
that it diverts little to no editorial attention away from authors more likely to accept 
the journal’s oﬀers.10 And on the rare occasion when a high-ﬂying author accepts one 
of the automated oﬀers, the journal will doubtless be delighted to accommodate the 
piece. Of course, if authors with that aﬃliation began to accept automated oﬀers with 
any frequency, the process of annually updating the journal’s presitge-point would shift 
papers from that school’s faculty into the individualized-review category. Automated-
oﬀer bubbles will thus pop nearly as quickly as they form. 
Third, the board should disregard all professors’ requests for expedited review that 
are based on fast-expiring automated oﬀers of publication from less prestigious law 
reviews. These automated oﬀers, as the board well knows, do not reﬂect any substantive 
editorial review. As a result, these oﬀers are probative of nothing other than the con-
ferring law review’s ability to establish their own prestige-point and correctly channel 
the piece by the author’s institutional aﬃliation.11 The board, moreover, can readily 
identify the automated oﬀers simply by requiring the requesting author to state how 
much time elapsed between submitting the piece to the other review and receiving a 
publication oﬀer from that review. 
By taking these three integrated, data-driven steps, the less prestigious law review 
boards can avoid wasting time carefully considering manuscripts from those who are 
most likely to shop the oﬀer successfully to a more prestigious journal. At the same 
time, the review can use the automated, short-fuse oﬀers to capture an occasional wind-
fall piece.  
One might object on the ground that it appears I fail to take account of an im-
portant reputational cost to the strategy that adopting law reviews would bear. Specif-
ically, it could—one imagines—harm a journal’s reputation as a serious scholarly venue 
to be seen to choose articles on grounds other than the reasoned, substantive consider-
ation of their content. This strikes me as incorrect, on two counts. First, student-edited 
law reviews do not have as far to fall, in reputation, as this critique may suppose. Many 
student law review members do an excellent job, and the law review process has led to 
many a good article becoming even better. At the same time, however, there are myriad 
                                                
10 Perhaps the pipeline providers, such as ExpressO and Scholastica, could include this functionality to 
law reviews, much as they have provided expedited-review-request functionality for authors. 
11 The individualized oﬀers, by contrast, are at least somewhat probative of the article’s substantive merit. 
See Saunders, supra note 6, at 1666 n.12 (reasoning that, by existing norms, an expedite request “alerts 
editors at the preferred law review [receiving the request] that the article is probably worth publishing 
(since the editorial board of a competing law review clearly believes so)”). 
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trenchant law-professor critiques of the inanity, at some level, of having our 2Ls serve 
as the most signiﬁcant gatekeepers of legal scholarship’s publishing potential. Second, 
the worry about loss of law-review reputation makes a quaint category mistake. The 
process for pairing publications to publishing slots is not a dispassionate philosophical 
inquiry by a convocation of Oxford dons.12 It is simply a self-interested matching mar-
ket, where nearly every piece ﬁnds a spot to rest when, as it were, the music stops. The 
market imperatives are candor, speed, and self-interest, not deep intellectual engage-
ment as such.13 So long, then, as a journal is open about the process I have described—
and there is no reason to conceal it—the journal’s reputation will suﬀer not at all. 
Alternatively, one might object on the ground that this strategy, were it to be 
widely adopted among the general law reviews outside the top 20 or 30 law schools, 
would disrupt the smooth functioning of the current manuscript market. Speciﬁcally, 
one might worry that, as more law reviews use automated oﬀers of publication, the 
received-an-oﬀer signal becomes too noisy to be of use to the more prestigious journals, 
many of whom reputedly rely heavily on expedite requests to help set their reading 
agendas.14 To this I can only respond that I have sought to follow the internal logic of 
the manuscript market to its natural conclusion. If less prestigious journals follow the 
strategy I describe, which is in their own interests, I am sure the matching market will 
adapt eﬀectively rather than simply unravel.15 Whether there is a diﬀerent, less reso-
lutely market-based conception according to which to organize the manuscript sorting 
and selection process, I cannot say.16 
 
                                                
12 See generally Dan Subotnik, A Law Review Editor and Faculty Author Learn to Speak Honestly, 32 TOURO 
L. REV. 441 (2016). 
13 To riﬀ on Mencken, law professors know what they want—unﬂinching self-interest—and deserve to 
get it good and hard. 
14 See Carl Tobias, Manuscript Selection Anti-Manifesto, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 529, 534 (1995) (“Editors 
of most elite reviews frequently do not read manuscripts until writers call with an oﬀer. A number of 
journals ask the oﬀeror’s identity, and a few even refuse to expedite review absent that information. 
These editors seem content to let less prestigious journals perform initial screens, in the apparent belief 
that only a narrow ﬁeld of high quality manuscripts will eventually ﬂoat to the apex of the hierarchy.”); 
William C. Whitford, The Need for an Exclusive Submission Policy for Law Review Articles, 1994 WIS. L. 
REV. 231, 231 (“Among authors it is widely believed that the ‘top’ reviews, such as those at Harvard or 
Yale, will not look at a manuscript unless the author is already famous (e.g., Richard Posner or Lawrence 
Tribe), or until the manuscript has been accepted at a respectable law review.”). 
15 Contra Grimmelmann, supra note 2, penultimate paragraph: “If we looked at law review placement 
only by asking what authors and law reviews want individually, the entire system would collapse, and 
would deserve to.” 
16 Contra Joseph Scott Miller, The Immorality of Requesting Expedited Review (Apr. 8, 2016), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2743299. But see also Jonathan Swift, Preface, in The Battle of the Books (1704) 
(“Satire is a sort of glass wherein beholders do generally discover everybody’s face but their own … .”). 
